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Since the publicationof "The Theory of Gamesand Economic Behavior" by 
vonNeumannandMorgenstern(1944), game theoryenriches theunderstandingof international 
relationships.However, toooften, at this international,the applicationof this theoryislimited 
tomilitary concerns andvery few to global strategic views that understand togethereconomy, 
tradeand finance, as well as cooperation amongStates.However,since the Cold War end,the 
emergence of newcountriesin South-East Asia, the BRICS, preserving economic 
interestsinvolves using newinstruments such asfinancial flows, monetary exchange 
rates,interest ratepolicy,R& D, space policy, trade agreements, etc. This arsenalis deployed 
withthe objective of ensuringprosperity andstability of Statesand notpermanently destroysan 
opponent.During the Cold War, the East and West blocks struggled one against the other one 
like twoSumo wrestlersortwochess players.Nowadays, multi-polarity rules a game 
characterized by complexity. Indeed, following their short terms or long term interests the 
States can become simultaneously partners or adversaries (see for instance, Evans, Graham 
and Newnham,Jeffrey (1998)). 
Then, how to model this multi-polarization of relations between states? The issue is 
even more complex than, according to circumstances the States are mutually sometimes 
partners and sometimes opponents (Evans, Graham and Newnham, Jeffrey (1998)). Facing 
with these developments, the States both have to preserve their interest and conquer new 
opportunities by using strategies that come more from the Go game (Weiqi in Chinese) than 
Chess. In a Go game, the world becomes a global space and the purpose it is to occupy the 
greatest surface by the placement and the supportive positioning of pegs (called stones) on the 
junction of transverse lines. The winner occupies the largest area of the game. This Chinese 
old-art game belonged to the military aristocracy close to the Emperor and was the only one 
allowed playing. It is in the spirit of GO game that we develop this study that focus on 
relations between different states. We show how they differentiate from standard players of 
usual game theory. This approach is a first attempt to characterize the strategic 
interrelationships between multiple players-states. Here, it will be limited to the inclusion of 
three players and not only two as usual. This extension does not result in the simple increase 
of the strategies possibilities, but can also lead to a structural change of the agents’ payoff 
functions. Indeed, for strategic reasons related to past mutual agreements, a given State may 
have interest in increasing the wealth of some of its partners compared to those of some of its 
opponents. This, of course, greatly enriches the range of possible and helps modifying the 
impact of strategies based on threats and promises. 
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1. Characterization of games between States and sequential choice of 
strategies 
 
With players such as governments or institutions, the rationality of choice and game structure 
is quite different from the standard structures on which we build the game theory 'standard' 
models. Obviously the deep nature of the game is quite similar to these ones so that we can 
legitimately consider that the games we describe belong to the bargaining games (Nash (1950) 
and (1953)). 
In concrete economies when speaking about governments, information 
arrivessequentially and the strategic choices supplied toplayers are common knowledge. A 
game in whicheach playerdiscoversthe strategy chosen bythe othersand plays simultaneously 
is nosense in thiscontext (Brams(1994), Stone (2001)). The implications ofthis findingare 
important.In particular, itmeans thatthe games fullinformation games that each player play 
sequentially andknowswhat the otherplayer has played. Schelling (1960) showed that normal 
orstrategic formgames do notreach the same solutionsfollowing they are played 
simultaneously or sequentially. This can besimplyillustratedbythegamesin Figures 1 and2. 
Thefirstgameisanincomplete information game.Both players1 and 2 mustchoose either theL 
orRstrategies. Inincomplete information, Nash equilibriaof this gameare(L,L), (R,R) orthe 
mixed strategy(1/6L+5/6R)for Player 1, (5/6L+ 1 /6.A) for player2. Theexpected gainin the 
caseof amixed strategyis then 1for each.The treeof this game istranscribed inFigure 1. 
 
  If we considera sequentialgame, where player 1plays first, this one benefits of aclear 
advantage. Indeed, heplaysthestrategyL which forcesplayer2 to playthe strategyL. We say 
“force”because, player 2 could threat player 1 to play R, to force player 1 to change his 
strategy and playing R. However, as a rationalbeingplayer 2 cannotcarry out histhreat, hewill 
prefer toearn1rather than 0. Hence, the equilibrium of the game is (L,L). 
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A. A three-players threat game 
 
 
Considering that three states (States 1,2,3) exchange together, that they maintain 
bilateral relations and that each one plays their strategies sequentially. This means that the 
order of the strategies choice is important. In the game bilateral relationships are described by 
pairs {(1,2), (2,3), (3,1)}, the first player chooses first his strategy (in the pair (a, b), a chooses 
first then b). In this three-player game, by assumption, each player knows his own payoff 
functions and the one of the other ones. The game is a full and perfect information game and 
it is described in Figure 3. The States adopt strategies of conquest and preservation of their 
interests falling over the strategy of the game of GO (Weiqi in Chinese) than chess. In this 
game, the world becomes a space for it to occupy the greater part by the placement and 
positioning of pieces (called stones) on a supporting organization. This is made by putting 
them on the junction of transverse lines.Is declared the winner the one who occupies the 
largest area of the game. This millennial game (should say art) is Chinese in origin and only 
close military aristocracy of the emperor was allowed to play. It is in this spirit that we will 
develop our study of relations between different States corresponding to players. The question 
that arises is how to model the multi-polarization of relations between States? The issue is 
even more complex that they are, depending on the circumstances, mutually partners and 
opponents. Evans, Graham and Newnham, Jeffrey (1998). 
 
B. Equilibrium of the game without prior agreement. 
 
The game described in Figure 3 can be analyzed as a sequential game that can be 
subdivided into three subsets: (1,2), (2,3) and (3,1) because the balances are made 
independent of each other. This results from the fact that players do not agree at the start of 
the game. No binding agreement, any agreement or cooperation is assumed. One can notice 
the similarity of the structures of the first two ((1,2),(2,3)), which allows the same treatment. 
a) SubgamesEquilibrium (1,2), (2,3)  
The two sub-games are threat games. In the game (1.2), 2 threatens to play 𝑑1, that 
brings him 5 and 0 to player 1 if this last one does not play 𝑎1. The latter strategy will make 
him win 7 against 1 to player 2.Player-1 understands that the threat is credible because if he 
chooses 𝑏1, it has no way to induce the player to play two 𝑐1 strategy that brings back him 2. 
The equilibrium strategy is: 
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- 𝑆
(1,2) 
∗ = (𝑎1), and the associated gainsforboth players: 
𝑔 1,2 =  𝑔1 𝑎1 ,𝑔2 𝑎1  = (1,7) 
 
About the game (2.3) the threat is not credible. Indeed, 3 threatens to play 𝑑2 if 2 does not 
play 𝑎2.  Now if 2 overrides, he will win 2 because the player 3 will be forced to play the 
strategy 𝑐2 and earns 3, whereas if he played the 𝑑2strategy, he would only gain 2. Therefore, 
the threat is not credible and equilibrium strategy 𝑆
(2,3) 
∗ = (𝑏2, 𝑐2 )will earn: 
𝑔 2,3 =  𝑔1 𝑏2, 𝑐2 ,𝑔2 𝑏2, 𝑐2  = (2,3) 
b) Equilibrium of thesubgame(3,1) 
 
In this game, the player 3 has theability to play the strategya3, consequently the  player 1 
makesa gain0, or 3 can play𝑏3,inducing 1 to access to the payoff7. Let us note that inboth 
cases, player 3earns the sameamount: 4.This equilibrium isspecificas it givesthe opportunityto 
3 to be apetty anddictatorialplayer by prohibiting 1 to gain 7 or to be generous, allowing him 
to get 7 by playing the to be3or(he playsthea3strategydeprivesplayer 1of any gain. or, 
conversely, liberalstrategy  𝑏3, 𝑒3 . 
 
Thisthree-player gameis trivialandits only interestis that it helps to extend the argument to 
three effectively interdependent players. Note alsothatthe sequential natureof these 
gamesexcludes anyuse of mixedstrategies.The equilibriumsolutionsare purestrategies. 
 
2. Game Equilibrium and prior cooperation agreement. 
The game described above would be of little interest if the players keep isolated and play 
independently of each other. We assume now that some players conclude cooperation 
agreements with each other as it happens in the framework of effective international relations. 
For instance, here, we consider that player 1 and player 3 establish a long run cooperation 
agreement ( as energy delivery, technology transfer, trade agreements…) so that a breach in 
the relationship leads both to significant losses and retaliation to which neither of them has 
interest. In our model, this agreement affects the agents’ payoff functions that are both 
sensitive to the chosen strategy and theother agents’ earnings. Thus, for each countryforming 
mutually binding agreements, each one will be careful to its partner’s prosperity. Therefore, 
one might think that the growth of the partner’s wealth brings it a higher level of satisfaction. 
Indeed, the partner becomes more solvent and that bodes new exchange phases. However, if 
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we think in hegemony terms, the partners may consider that beyond a given threshold, 
cooperation may become harmful. To take this into account, one can consider a concavity in 
the payoff function. That means that beyond a given level of the partner’s enrichment, the 
country would suffer a diminishing marginal utility. To do this, we consider that the agents’ 
satisfaction functions depend on𝑈𝑗 (𝑔1,𝑔2,𝑔3),𝑗 =  1,2,3  gain  of 3 players (indexed by j) are 
"standard" and if gj  represents the gain of player 𝑗, 𝑗 = 1,2,3. This gain is associated with the 
adoption of a strategy Sj   such that: 
𝑈𝑗 (𝑔1 𝑆1 ,𝑔2 𝑆2 ,𝑔3 𝑆3 ) 
In the standard case, the agent is attentive to its own gains and the expression above can be 
rewritten: 
𝑈𝑗  𝑔𝑗  𝑆𝑗   = 𝑈𝑗 (𝑆𝑗 ) 
 
Let's assume that, in our example, 1 and 3 players-States decide to cooperate. This 
cooperation led to the following expressions: 𝑈1𝑔1
′  𝑔1,𝑔2,𝑔3 > 0 and, 𝑈1𝑔3
′  𝑔1,𝑔2,𝑔3 > 0, 
which reflects the interest of player 1 to player 3 with 𝑈1𝑔3𝑔3
′′  𝑔1,𝑔2,𝑔3 ≤ 0. Concavity 
means that above a certain level of player’s 3 gain, player 1 experiences inconvenience or it 
may consider that its position may be threatened by player 3. Similarly, for the player-State 3: 
𝑈3𝑔3
′  𝑔1,𝑔2,𝑔3 > 0et 𝑈3𝑔1
′  𝑔1,𝑔2,𝑔3 > 0, with 𝑈3𝑔1𝑔1
′′  𝑔1,𝑔2,𝑔3 ≤ 0. This means that 
there is interdependence between the different players {1,2,3} and this fact opens the way to 
several scenarios and, as such, to several possible equilibria. 
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. 
Scenario 1 
This scenariodraws the consequencesof above mentioned 
behavioralassumptions.Thegame equilibrium without prior agreementare maintained.The only 
notablepoint isthat, nowin the game between players 3 and 1 (i.e.(3.1)), Player 3 
preferschoosingthe𝑏3strategy that ensures toPlayer 1a payoff of7rather than0 ifPlayer 1had 
played𝑎3. Indeed,given ourassumptions: 
𝑈3 𝑔1 𝑆1 ,𝑔2 𝑆2 ,𝑔3 𝑆3  = 𝑈3 4,𝑔2 .  , 0 < 𝑈3(4,𝑔2 .  , 7) 
The script,however,can complicatedif it turns outthat thecoalition formed by the Cooperation 
Agreementbetween 1 and 3is accompaniedbytheir mutual satisfaction of seeingPlayer 2’s 
payoffrestricted.Scenario 2 studiesthis point. 
Scenario 2 
To the previousassumptions,  
- 𝑈1𝑔1
′  𝑔1,𝑔2,𝑔3 > 0 et, 𝑈1𝑔3
′  𝑔1,𝑔2,𝑔3 > 0, et  
- 𝑈3𝑔3
′  𝑔1,𝑔2,𝑔3 > 0et 𝑈3𝑔1
′  𝑔1,𝑔2,𝑔3 > 0,  
Weaddthat : 
- 𝑈1𝑔2
′  𝑔1,𝑔2,𝑔3 ≤ 0et 𝑈3𝑔2
′  𝑔1,𝑔2,𝑔3 ≤ 0. 
That means that the rise in the Player 2’s gain decreases the level of satisfaction of 
both Players 1 and 3.   
That means that under this scenario, Player 3 is conditioning the play of its favorable 
and generous strategy towards Player 1 (i.e.    𝑏3, 𝑒3 ) to the obligation not to yield to threats 
that is, however, perfectly credible. In this case, and it is the core of the paper, Player 1 and 3 
have convergent interests in their purpose of lowering the Player-2’s payoff. In this case the 
equilibrium strategy becomes:  
𝑆𝐸
∗ =   𝑏1,𝑑1  ,  𝑏2, 𝑐2 ,  𝑏3, 𝑒3   
This involves the following payoffs for each player: 
𝐺1(𝑆𝐸
∗) = 𝑔1 1,2 + 𝑔1 3,1 = 𝑔1 𝑏1,𝑑1 +  𝑔1 𝑏3, 𝑒3 = 0 + 7 = 7 
𝐺2(𝑆𝐸
∗) = 𝑔2 1,2 + 𝑔2 2,3 = 𝑔2 𝑏1,𝑑1 +  𝑔2 𝑏2, 𝑐2 = 5 + 3 = 8 
𝐺3(𝑆𝐸
∗) = 𝑔3 2,3 + 𝑔3 3,1 = 𝑔3 𝑏2, 𝑐2 + 𝑔3 𝑏3, 𝑒3 = 3 + 4 = 7 
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Remark 1 
One point especially worthy of note is that with or without prior agreement between 
players 1 and 3, the Player-3’s payoffs are identical. Indeed, one can check that without this 
agreement the payoffs are: 
𝐺1 = 𝑔1 1,2 + 𝑔1 3,1 = 𝑔1 𝑎1 +  𝑔1 𝑎3 = 1 + 0 = 1 
(Or,𝐺1 = 𝑔1 1,2 + 𝑔1 3,1 = 𝑔1 𝑎1 +  𝑔1 𝑏3, 𝑒3 = 1 + 7 = 8) 
𝐺2 = 𝑔2 1,2 + 𝑔2 2,3 = 𝑔2 𝑎1 +   𝑔2 𝑏2, 𝑐2 = 7 + 3 = 10 
𝐺3 = 𝑔3 2,3 + 𝑔3 3,1 = 𝑔3 𝑏2, 𝑐2 +  𝑔31 𝑏3, 𝑒3 (𝑜𝑢 𝑔31 𝑎3 )  = 3 + 4 = 7 
 
Thus, it is only because that: 
𝑈3 𝑔1 𝑆1 ,𝑔2 𝑆2 ,𝑔3 𝑆3  = 𝑈3 4,10,7 < 𝑈3(4,8,7) 
hat strategy that promotes 1,  𝑏3, 𝑒3 is chosen rather than the strategy 𝑎3. 
Remark2 : 
Coalition between players 1 and 3 must be based on a particularly binding cooperation 
agreement to induce Player-1 to overcome player-2’s credible threat and it associated risk. 
Indeed, if Player-3 does not hold its commitment and plays strategy a3  rather than  b3, e3 , 
the player’s 1 payoff becomes then : 
𝐺1 = 𝑔1 1,2 + 𝑔1 3,1 = 𝑔1 𝑏1,𝑑1 +  𝑔1 𝑎3 = 0 + 0 = 0 
Thus, facing this lack of confidence, player 1 will it tempted to yield to the credible threat of 
Player 2. So the Nash of equilibrium of the system without commitment binding (binding 
agreement) will be: 
𝑆𝑁1
∗ =  𝑎1,  𝑏2, 𝑐2 ,𝑎3 or, 
𝑆𝑁2
∗ =  𝑎1,  𝑏2, 𝑐2 ,  𝑏3, 𝑒3  , if  3 waives "punishing" player 1. 
The gains associated with these strategies are then the following 
𝐺1(𝑆𝑁1
∗ ) = 𝑔1 1,2 + 𝑔1 3,1 = 𝑔1 𝑎1 +  𝑔1 𝑎3 = 1 + 0 = 1 
𝐺2(𝑆𝑁1
∗ ) = 𝑔2 1,2 + 𝑔2 2,3 = 𝑔2 𝑎1 +  𝑔2 𝑏2, 𝑐2 = 7 + 3 = 10 
𝐺3(𝑆𝑁1
∗ ) = 𝑔3 2,3 + 𝑔3 3,1 = 𝑔3 𝑏2, 𝑐2 +  𝑔3 𝑎3 = 3 + 4 = 7 
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Remark 3  
The Nash equilibria defined in note 2 are the same as for a game that would not have 
been played sequentially but simultaneously. This results from the fact that the 
agreement is not sufficiently credible. 
3. Conditions of cooperation 
The credibility of the cooperation can be achieved in one of two ways. The first one is 
based on the extension of the game to a relationship between player 1 and player 3. In this 
case, the relationship will be of the type (1.3) as described in figure 4. This figure is an 
extension of the game between two players where the playing order is reversed in the 
sequence. (This can be another part of trade between the two countries. But, this time, it 
would be Player-1 that would have the opportunity to play first). 
The second way starts from the remark that the relationships between States extend in 
the long term. By extension, the game looks like can a repeated game. This hypothesis is 
somewhat simplistic but acceptable considering the nature of trade relations that relate to 
energy, agri-food goods, manufactured products, etc. are dependent on the population growth, 
the consumption patterns, past trade agreements. It follows that from one year to another, the 
volume and the structure of bilateral trade evolve shortly (for example, the gas and oil 
imported into China from the Federation of Russia does not suffer variation of high-
amplitude). This repetition in trade does not prevent the opening of new opportunities (new 
contracts and partners for example) but later in the statement, by assumption, we consider that 
gain matrices remain identical. 
a) Extension of the game 
 As mentioned above, we consider that players 1 and 3 develop exchanges 
characterized by the fact that Player-1 plays first. We can easily see that following this 
pattern, Player-1 may effectively threaten Player-3 playing strategy 𝑏4. Without more, it 
appears that threatening 3 will deter it to break the agreement concluded with Player-1. The 
Nash equilibrium of the game and the associated payouts are then: 
𝐺1 = 𝑔1 1,2 + 𝑔1 3,1 = 𝑔1 𝑏1,𝑑1 +  𝑔1 𝑏3, 𝑒3 + 𝑔1 𝑎4,𝑑4 = 0 + 7 + 8 = 15 
 (refusalfrom Player1 to yield to the credible threat made by Player-2): 
G2 = g2 1,2 + g2 2,3 = g2 b1, d1 +  g2 b2, c2 = 5 + 3 = 8 
G3 = g3 2,3 + g3 3,1 = g3 b2, c2 +  g3 b3, e3 + g3 a4, d4 = 3 + 4 + 7 = 14 
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Hence, Player-1’s threats of playing strategy 𝑏4in case of deviation from Player-3 
when playing the game (3.1) is sufficient to encourage this last one not to deviate. We can 
evaluate the gains from a deviation. Hence, if for instance players 1 and 3 deviate: 
 
𝐺1 = 𝑔1 1,2 + 𝑔1 3,1 = 𝑔1 𝑎1 +  𝑔1 𝑎3 + 𝑔1 𝑏4,𝑓4 = 1 + 0 + 9 = 10 
𝐺2 = 𝑔2 1,2 + 𝑔2 2,3 = 𝑔2 𝑎1 +  𝑔2 𝑏2, 𝑐2 = 7 + 3 = 10 
𝐺3 = 𝑔3 2,3 + 𝑔3 3,1 = 𝑔3 𝑏2, 𝑐2 +  𝑔3 𝑎3 + 𝑔3 𝑏4,𝑓4 = 3 + 4 + 3 = 7. 
 
It is obvious that the deviation is not an option. Indeed, the gains of the deviant 
coalition are: 𝐺1 + 𝐺3 = 17while without deviation, the coalition wins: 15 + 14 = 19. In 
addition,  deviating leads to strengthen the Player-2’s position, then the players 1 and 3 see 
their satisfaction level increased. Adding a game sequence leads both players 1 and 3 players 
to adopt cooperative choices. The structure of game more than the prior agreement leads to 
focus on cooperation. 
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b) Repeated game 
In arepeated game, the equilibriumdefined inremark 2cannot beconsidered alasting 
equilibrium. In the contextof this articlethe developments relatingto the repetition ofgameswill 
be discussedsyntheticallyand notanalytically.This choice is due not only toreasons of space, 
but also bythe need clarifyingthe analyticalconsequences of gamesmadebetweenthese 
specificplayers that are theStates.Thus, unlike thestandard approachesof repeated games 
theory, equilibrium made with mixed strategieshere have nomeaning.Indeed, a government 
cannotrandomly chooseamong severalstrategies.The strategiesare not simultaneous 
playedbutsequentially. In addition,the game's storyis importantso thatrepeated gamesarein 
closed loop.Furthermore, itis unrealistic to assumethat the samegain structureis 
repeatedendlessly.Also,the time intervalis itfixed. 
In a repeated game, the issue of the threat involves applying sanctions corresponding 
to punitive strategies (case of repeated prisoner's dilemma) this in the aim at forcing players to 
use cooperative strategies. Thus, the equilibrium solution that appears in remark 2, is 
acceptable only for a game played only once. Here, repeating the game (without the extension 
proposed in the last section) is sufficient to ensure the coalition stability. Indeed, repeating 
SN1
∗  will lead in the long run to deplete players’ 1 wealth and strengthen the player-2’s 
position and this is contrary to the utility of both players 1 and 3. Moreover, considering the 
international relationships, repairing an agreement that has been broken cannot be made by 
accepting the penalty and the return to the 'good' strategy. Trust is paramount. Indeed, a single 
failure is sufficient to call into question the partners’ good faith and a State cannot afford to 
rebuild confidence to the one who breached the agreement. Thus, in the framework of a 
repeated game, the only acceptable strategy is the strategy 𝑆𝐸
∗ . We remind that this strategy 
requires to 1 to override the Player-2’s credible threat by virtue of the cooperation agreement 
passed with the player 3. 
 
4. Economic and geostrategic implications in conclusion 
 
This article highlights the importance of the use of credible and non-credible threats. Its main 
lesson is that cooperation is even stronger when based on long-term relationships which 
makes failures implausible. It reasonably well describes the relationships that exist between 
the Russian Federation and China (players 1 and 3), player 2 for example being Europe. 
Obviously, one may object that the United States are missing from the picture. In fact, adding 
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a fourth partner would not have changed the global framework of the game but would have 
add in complexity. 
 
All in all, international relationsships analysis can usefully be studied in terms of classical 
game theory. However, this approach needs adaptations of standard game theory. Indeed, t 
these games are sequential and they mainly accept pure strategies as solution of the game but 
not mixed strategies which are non sense in this context. However, mixed strategies  can be 
conceived in the cases of armed conflict. To conclude, even if not developed, the spirit of GO 
game motivated our paper in which cooperation between two players does not exclude 
competition. Players 1 and 3 of our representation understood that they could not permanently 
exclude on each other from the international scene. Then, they preferred delineate areas that 
give them the highest possible benefits. In the simple model we gave, Player-2 bears the brunt 
of this agreement. 
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